James Tobin relates the following story, whch was told to h m and other members of the Harvard graduate economics club by Professor W. L. Crum. In the 1920s the Harvard Economic Service (HES) issued monthly reports on the current and expected future state of the economy. HES used three indexes, representing speculation, business, and money, to help predict the future. Crum claimed that in the summer of 1929 the statistical assistant at HES became alarmed when she noticed that the indexes indicated that a sharp downturn in economic activity was imminent. Crum did not see in the current business situation any cause for thls adverse forecast. Moreover, he feared that a pessimistic forecast by the influential service could itself have an adverse effect on financial markets and economic activity. Therefore, he suppressed the pessimistic findings of the assistant;' the published report did not speak of a potential downturn.
The data, in fact, provide only mild support for t h s account. The account does, however, raise the more general question of whether the Depression was forecastable. Was there anythmg in the data prior to the 'Dominguez: John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, MA 02138, Fair and Shaplro: Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics. Yale University, New Haven, CT 06520, and National Bureau of Economic Research. We are grateful for helpful comments from James Tobin, Paul A. Samuelson, and anonymous referees.
'~n d conseauentlv he lost the opportunity to gain a October 1929 stock market Crash that indicated the economy was about to enter a protracted slowdown? How should the news of the Crash have revised forecasts of economic growth? To address these questions, we study two sets of data assembled by contemporary business-conditions forecasters. The first consists of the three HES indexes. The second consists of commodity and stock price indexes compiled and analyzed by Irving Fisher. Fisher, who was at Yale from 1891 until h s death in 1947, was a competitor of HES. He also released periodic reports on the state of the economy, and he was a critic of the HES indexes.
We also use modern historical data on industrial production, producer prices, stock prices, time-loan rates, and the money stock in our statistical analysis. The use of these data allows us to address the broader question of the forecastability of the Depression without recourse to the services' idiosyncratic data. We can also ask whether the Depression-era data contain information not embodied in the modern data.
The procedures, data, and pronouncements of the Harvard and Yale forecasting services are discussed in Section I, where the accuracy of Crum's account is also investigated. Both services failed to anticipate the Depression and remained optimistic about economic performance following the Crash. 1, the following section, we examine the data using time-series analysis. The analysis Suggests that the services' optimism was unwarranted.
I. The Harvard and Yale Forecasting Services
The Harvard and Yale economic forecasting services were probably the two preeminent economic analysis and forecasting services available to businesses and members of the general public in the 1920s. Despite their similarities-their association with prominent academic institutions-they were quite different in purpose and organization. The Harvard service, whch had a full-time professional staff, was designed as a business whose object was to provide corporations with economic analysis for short-and longrange planning. By contrast, Fisher provided a service that was designed originally as an educational tool for the public. Later, Fisher developed a full-scale advisory b u~i n e s s ,~ but initially hls pronouncements were published weekly in a syndicated newspaper column on economic affairs that appeared nationwide.
T h s section summarizes the activities of the two forecasting services. The Appendix gives a more detailed chronology of their pronouncements.
A. Harvard Economic Service
The HES forecasts, whch were offered to businesses by annual sub~cription,were centered on the Service's Index of General Business Conditions, whch was created by HES's first editor, Warren Persons. Its three curves were meant to represent "speculation" (the A-curve), "business" (the B-curve), and "money" (the C-curve). The Harvard forecasts were then based on the relations determined to exist among the three curves during any given phase of the business cycle '1n 1930. Fisher and on the magnitude of the movement from peak to trough of each curve (Persons, 1922) .
Although the specific series that made up the three curves changed over the thrteen years that HES published the indexes, the basic index methodology remained the same. Curve A, representing speculation, included a series of New York bank clearings and industrial stock prices; curve B, representing business, included outside bank debits and commodity prices; curve C, representing money, was based upon commercial paper rates.
The construction of the three indicators was as follows. First, the underlying component(~) in the index were adjusted for seasonality. Then, for each underlying component, a "similar" series not in the index was isolated, whch was thought to represent a secular trend relative to the cyclical component in question. (For example, for the "money" series, the baseline was the average yield of ten prime railroad bonds of distant maturities.) Percentage deviations between each component of the index and the "baseline" series were taken and then normalized by the appropriate standard deviation. The resulting groups of adjusted components were then averaged to form the relevant index curve.
The resulting indexes are illustrated in Figures 1 and 2 for, respectively, the years 1904-13 and 1919-31.~ The Harvard data 'curve B as first constructed by Persons in 1919 was a composite of economic series that reflected business conditiona, including both production of materials and goods (most notably, pig-iron production) and transactions in commodities and services. The curve was revised in 1923 to include only bank debits and a tencommodity price index. The position of the baseline (Bradstreet's index) used in constructing curve B "was determined by shifting the curve upward so that the crossing points with the ten-commodity index would correspond to the dates of crossing given for pig iron production, the index of trade, and outside debits." [Pelsons, 1923 [Pelsons, , p. 1871 As can be seen. there appears to be strong predictive power in the earlier period. A close inspection of HES's brochure suggests. however. that the remarkable fit was in fact achieved by an "exhaustive study of business statistics. for the primary purpose of developing a reliable index of general business conditions" [Harvard University Committee on Economic Research. 1923b. p. 81 and that this exhaustive study was performed using data from the years 1904-13. 
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B. Irving Fisher
Beginning in January 1923, Irving Fisher's Business Page included the Fisher Commodity Price Index and the Purchasing Power of the Dollar Index, along with weekly discussions of relevant economic issues of the time. The Commodity Price index is Fisher's "Ideal" index, a geometric average of base and current period weighted indexes. [Fisher, 1923, p. 8351 The Purchasing Power of the Dollar index is simply the inverse of the Commodity Price index. The duplication was, however, central to Fisher's missionary ideas for his service. He aimed to educate the public to eliminate money illusion.'
In 1925 Fisher added to his analysis a stock market index, which consisted of a weighted value index for the market, with stocks picked based on a standard of "popularity." The index was computed based on averaging the value of the previous week's fifty best-selling stocks, based on total market value of share turnover. The index was linked across weeks by calculating a composite average based on the subsample of stocks that appeared in both weeks' indexes. [Fisher, 19271 Unlike HES's, Fisher's forecasts were simple and straightforward applications of the classical paradigm, allowing for some rigidities slowing adjustment. Thus, for example, a falling dollar and rising commodity prices "shows that the volume of money and credit available is increasing faster than its utilization in the production and exchange of goods and services. When more money and credit are applied to the same (or smaller) volume of goods and services, it results in increased competition by the funds for the available goods and ~ervices."Rising commodity 7~i s h e r analyzes a number of indices published at the time. In a footnote, Fisher comments on the Hanrard index methodology: "One of the most interesting kinds of index number is Prof. Person's new index number for usu as a barometer of trade. In this case the selection of the 10 commodities included is based, not on any of the usual criteria, but on their previous behavior in relation to the business cycle." [Fisher, 1927 , p. 3361 'see Edwin Newdick (1929 . A brief exposition of Fisher's forecasting methodolgy, "How to Use Fisher
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prices would thus engender a forecast of declines in real interest rates, a rising industrial production rate, and increasing inventories due to increases in the value of goods. Although Fisher's economic analyses are less chartist than HES's, hls predictions in the period before and after the Crash were no closer to the mark than those of h s Harvard brethren. Indeed, his analyses during 1930 and 1931 were consistently even more optimistic than H a r~a r d ' s .Ĩmmed-iately after the Crash he noted that price/earnings ratios of less than eleven for industrial stocks were too low given expected earnings and dividend growth in the future. Throughout 1930 Fisher continued to compare favorably the current situation to the 1920-21 recession. Even by late 1931, Fisher continued to read good news into the bad. He believed that commodity prices had temporarily leveled off and business was soon to see a long overdue turnaround.
Statistical Analysis
The above discussion of the Harvard and Yale services and the detailed chronology of their pronouncements in the Appendix makes clear that the services neither predicted a downturn before the Crash nor became substantially more pessimistic about the economy following the Crash. In t h s section, we use time-series methods to study whether these optimistic projections were warranted by the data.
To study the forecastability of the Depression, we estimate a number of vector autoregressive (VAR) models using the Harvard and Fisher data and the modern historical data. The models differ in the number of variables included. The lengths of the estimation periods also differ across models, depending on data availability.
Each equation includes a constant and twelve lags of all the variables in the system. Indexes" by Newdick, was part of the F~tlanc~ai Anuiys~s Serclce subscription package.
'~~a i n , the chronology in the Appendix supports the following brief summary of Fisher's views.
We impose Litterman's Bayesian prior that the variables follow univariate random walks. The standard deviations of the prior take the form where r indexes the left-hand side variable, j indexes the right-hand side variables, and k indexes the lag. s, is the standard error of the unrestricted equation for variable i. We
We also computed all the estimates with a lag length of two with no priors imposed. These results were quite similar to the results using twelve lags, and so only the forecasts using twelve lags are reported below.
The HES variables are the A , B, and C indexes. The data for these variables begin in January 1919. The Fisher variables are h s commodity price index and h s stock price index. The data for both of these variables are available beginning in January 1925. The modern historical variables are an industrial production index, a producer price index, a stock price index, a three-month interest rate, and a measure of the money stock. We use two indexes of industrial production, one from the Federal Reserve, whch begins in January 1919, and one from Babson, which begins in January 1890." The producer price index is the Bureau of Labor Statistics allcommodity wholesale price index; the stock price index is Cowles all-stock index; and the interest rate is the three-month time loan rate of N. Gregory Mankiw, Jeffrey Miron, and David Weil (1987) . The data on these three variables are available beginning at least in January 1890. The money stock 10 These priors are somewhat looser than those recommended by Christopher Sims (1987, p. 446) . In the RATS programming language, they can be expressed as tightness = 0.3, harmonic decay = 1.0, and other's weight = 0.75. See Thomas Doan and Robert Litterman series, which begins in May 1907, is Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz's (1970) M2 series.'* In the estimation work, we use logarithms of the variables except for the A , B, and C variables and the interest rate variable, which were kept in their natural units.
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We use the same procedure for each VAR model. The model is first estimated through a particular month. A dynamic, 24-month forecast is then generated using the model, where the forecast begins one month after the end of the estimation period. Six sets of estimates and forecasts are made per model. The first forecast period begins in July 1929 (and so the first estimation period ends in June 1929). The starting dates of the other five forecasts are October 1929 , November 1929 , December 1929 , January 1930 , and July 1930 . In the figures below we report ' "he data and data sources are discussed in the Appendix.
results only for industrial production and producer prices, although, of course, the forecasts of all the variables in the model underlie these calculations.
The first model consists of eight variables -the five modern variables plus the A , B, and C variables. The estimation periods begin in January 1920. We first test the hypothesis that the A , B, and C variables have coefficients of zero in the industrial production and producer price equations. When two lags are used per variable, the chi-square value is 35.1, which for 12 degrees of freedom rejects the hypothesis at the .O1 level. When twelve lags are used, the chi-square value is similar, 38.5, although with the Bayesian priors imposed the number of degrees of freedom is difficult to interpret. At any rate, it thus seems from at least the two-lag case that the A , B, and C variables are jointly significant.
The forecasting results are presented in give the 24-month forecasts.13 It is clear from is 14.5, which with 8 degrees of freedom is Figure 3 that neither before nor after the significant at the .O1 level. Again, the value Crash does the VAR system forecast the of 14.8 in the twelve-lag case is similar. Depression. Aside from slight dips in output Figure 4 presents the forecasting results in several of the forecasts for a few months.
for this model. The first three forecasts all the forecasts indicate continued expan-(through the estimation period ending in Ocsion of the economy. All the forecasts thus tober 1929) show rapid expansion in output. produce large, negative errors in later peri-
The implied annual growth rates approach ods. The price forecasts similarly systematidouble digits. Once the Crash is embodied in cally overpredict the price level.
the initial conditions, the forecasts show The second model consists of the five sharp declines in output followed by sharp modern variables plus Fisher's two variables.
rebounds in about a year. Except for the The estimation periods begin in January slight deflation forecast before the Crash, the 1926. Because Fisher stopped issuing his data forecasts of the producer price index are in May 1930, we include only the first five essentially flat, and so they imply large foreforecasts. We also test the hypothesis that cast errors. the two Fisher variables are zero in the in-
The two models examined so far are based dustrial production and producer price equaon estimation periods that contain only obtions. In the two-lag case the ch-square value servations from the 1920s. Aside from the sharp recession at the beginning of the decadi, the 1920s witnessed strong and susu 13Although the estimates are based on logarithms of tained economic growth. It thus may be that industrial production and producer prices, the results the poor performance of the models is simare reported for levels of these variables.
ply due to the use of estimation periods that are too short. In other words, one might not expect to find seeds of the Depression in the data from the 1920s using time-series methods. We can, however, examine whether the poor forecasting performance of the models is due to the small sample by extending the estimation period back much further. Moore and Victor Zarnowitz, 1986, p. 750) , some quite severe. These data thus provide a much firmer basis for attempting to forecast the Depression using time-series methods. Before extending the sample backward, we present estimates based on the modern variables only, but using the same sample periods as for the HES and Fisher data. These estimates show how the HES and Fisher data affect the forecasts. In Figure 5 we present forecasts from the model using only the five modern variables for the estimation periods beginning in January 1920. These forecasts are comparable to those in Figure 3 except that the HES data are excluded. The forecasts in Figure 5 are close to those in Figure 3 , which suggest that the HES variables have little incremental value in forecasting industrial production and producer prices, even though they are jointly significant in the two equations.
We next estimated the model using only the five modern variables for the estimation periods beginning in January 1926. The forecasts are presented in Figure 6 . These forecasts are comparable to those in Figure 4 except that Fisher's data are excluded. As in Figure 4 , output is forecast to grow much faster than it did, but the size of the forecast errors are smaller than when Fisher's data are included.
Figures 5 and 6 show that the HES and Fisher data do not much affect the forecasts of the Depression based on data from the 1920s. We now consider the effects of lengthening the estimation period. The forecasts in Figure 7 are based on the use of the five modern variables for the estimation periods begnning in May 1908.14 The beginning of the estimation periods is dictated by the money data, which are available beginning in May 1907. The first forecast in Figure 7 , based on information through June 1929, shows a moderate downturn in production. This is not true, however, for the other five forecasts. The forecasts for the price level in Figure 7 are more stnking. The dramatic deflation of the early 1930s is predicted in the forecasts based on data through the first months after the Crash. Interestingly enough, the last two forecasts, whose
14
Given that the estimation period now begins before the Federal Reserve's industrial production index is available, these and subsequent results use the Babson index. Forecasts based on the use of Babson's index for the estimation periods beginning in January 1920 are almost identical to those presented in Figure 5 using the Federal Reserve's index. initial conditions clearly reflect the actual start of the deflation, do not forecast the continuation of the deflation.
The forecasts in Figure 8 are based on the same estimation periods as those in Figure 7 , but the money stock variable is dropped. The model thus consists of only four modern variables. The thrd forecast in Figure 8 predicts the continuing fall in output fairly well, although the others do not. As in Figure 7 , the first three forecasts of the price level predict the deflation quite well. Because similar results are obtained without the money data in Figure 8 , the forecasts of the deflation in Figure 7 do not depend on the use of the money data.
Finally, the forecasts in Figure 9 are based on the use of the four modern variables (excluding the money stock) for the estimation periods beginning in January 1891. This sample period is the longest at our disposal with these data. The results show that except for slight downturns in the forecasts based on data through October and November 1929 (the third and fourth forecasts) industrial 
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16 - production is predicted to grow on trend. As in Figures 7 and 8 , the early forecasts for the price level give very accurate forecasts for the deflation, but these are revised upward in the forecasts based on information through December 1929 and June 1930. In summary, the results in Figures 3  through 9 show that the large declines in output at the beginning of the Depression were essentially not predicted in both the months before the Crash and once the news of the Crash is taken into account. In a few of the systems, small output declines are predicted, but even these more accurate predictions disappear over longer horizons and as the forecasts adjust to the changing initial conditions. Similarly, the large deflation was not systematically predicted by the systems. In the estimates based on the long samples (Figures 7-9 ), the early forecasts, which are conditional on data leading up to and just following the Crash, are quite accurate. These forecasting successes should not be overemphasized, however, because the forecasts are very unstable as the initial conditions and coefficient estimates change. Hence, aside from a hint of forecastability of the deflation, the Depression was unforecastable using our time-series methods. Therefore, the Harvard Economic Service, Irving Fisher, or an econometrician endowed with modern time-series methods and data would be justified in appearing optimistic about the economy on the eve of and in the months following the Crash.
-
12-
-
8 [ ' ~ ' ~ ' l c ~ ' ' ' ~ ~ J A
VOL. 78 NO. 4 DO!MINGUEZ E T A L . : FORECASTING T H E DEPRESSIOR:
52 PRODUCER PRICES , ,
Conclusion
Our results imply that the Harvard and Yale forecasters cannot necessarily be faulted for remaining optimistic after the Crash. Their continued optimism is consistent with our conclusion based on time-series methods that the Depression was not forecastable. They were both justified in holding what ex post was an incorrect view. Thus, one might conclude that Hanard and Yale tied.
Our finding that the Depression was not forecastable should be interpreted cautiously. Our time-series findings do not rule out the possibility that a structural model based on restrictions from economic theory could forecast the Depression. None of the major theories of the Depression, however, necessarily imply that the Depression was forecastable. Friedman and Schwartz (1963) place the blame for the Depression on mistakes made by the Federal Reserve, in particular the fact that the money stock fell by over a third from August 1929 to March 1933. No one suggests that these mistakes were forecastable. Peter Temin (1976) stresses autonomous declines in aggregate demand, and insofar as these were unforecastable, his theory does not make the Depression forecastable. Charles Kindleberger's (1986) account of the Depression stresses the role of financial panics and the collapse of commodity prices. Again, these are not likely to be forecastable. James Hamilton (1987) does argue that the monetary contraction started in 1928. If this early monetary contraction were an important cause of the Depression, our regressions could in principle detect it. Yet, Hamilton (1987, pp. 167-68) does not suggest that the monetary contraction in 1928 was sufficient to cause the Depression, so the failure of time-series techniques to forecast the Depression may not contradict hls account. The leading explanations of the Depression are thus based on unforecastable policy and economic disturbances. Therefore, finding that the Depression is unforecastable does not help distinguish among these explanations of its cause. Hurcurd Eco12omic Service. In April 1929, HES issued the following warning about the overheated economic environment:
Recent developments-notably the weakness of certain commodity prices, as well as the money tension-suggest some recession from the present level of business.. . .
A renewed unsettlement of stock prices, perhaps a protracted liquidation, might well result under present conditions of money tension.. . . Business is not in the strained condition which has led to real depression in the past; and, while interest rates are now hgher than at any other time since 1921, the present large resources of the reserve system give assurance that no shortage of credit for industrial purposes will develop.
[ HES, 4/20/1929]15 This view persisted through the summer of 1929. In May, the Service noted that "The signs pointing to recession continue to pile up" [HES, 5/18/1929] .
By mid-September, when the speculation index was rising, the tone moderated considerably:
Recent developments (reduced volume of construction projects, below average crop prospects, unfavorable international trade balances) have tended to emphasize the unfavorable elements in the business (as distinguished from the financial) situation.. . . But no sharp decline has appeared in general business, and activity remains high.
[HES, 9/21/1929]
The week prior to Black Friday, the assessment was that
If recession should threaten serious consequences for business (as is not indicated at present) there is little doubt that the reserve system would take steps to ease the money market and so check the movement. [HES, 10/19/1929] This tone persisted as calamities mounted over the coming year. Immediately following the Crash, in early November, the appraisal was that Doubtless the losses entailed by the decline in stocks will increase the extent of the present business recession. On the other hand, money rates have declined promptly and considerably.. .this is in itself evidence of the soundness of the present business situation. Under such conditions, we believe that the present recession, both for stocks and business. is not the Drecursor of business depression, but will prove intermediate in character.
[ HES, 11/2/1929] By late December 1929, the Harvard staff was even forecasting recovery:
Today a depression seems improbable, and continuance of business recession is all that is in prospect. This justifies a forecast of recovery of business next spring, with further improvement in the fall, so that 1930, as a whole, should prove at least a fairly good year.
[ HES, 12/21/1929] Confidence then continued as the downturn worsened:
Since our monetary and credit structure is not only sound but unusually strong, commercial credits are liquid, and production for some months has probably been less than current demands, there is every prospect that the recovery which we have been expecting will not be long delayed, and that the only change that need be made in our forecast is that t h s fall business will not acquire as much impetus as we have been expecting. [HES, 8/20/1930] 
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Except in construction activity, the current depression seems to be following much the same course as that of 1920-21, as respects the length and severity of decline and the inception of recovery; and we conclude that improvement in business volumes, the first step in business recovery, is already underway. [HES. 6/30/1931] A dawning awareness that t h s economic downturn was not similar in nature to those preceding it is found in the final months of 1931. In August, the Service noted that "If financial unsettlement continues in Europe, real business recovery here may be prevented... " [HES. 8/22/1931] . And by December of that year. the assessment had finally become quite bleak:
But though the threatening elements in the situation are fewer, adequate grounds for forecasting business revival
have not yet appeared. [HES, 12/19/1931] Irrririg Fisher. In September 1929, Fisher was bullish about future economic prospects, seeing none of the potential warning signs that Harvard service had noted through the summer of that year.'"
We have witnessed probably the greatest expansion in history, within any similar period of time, of the rcal income of a people. . . . The alarm over the supposed inflation of security values seem unjustified by the recent record of dividend yields, increases whlch doubtless will be followed by much larger increases. [Fisher, 9/2/1929] 
The day before Black Friday. Fisher continued bullish in the face of the (relatively) small perturbations that had rocked the market in recent weeks and stirred concern on Wall Street.
The [stock market] break certainly exhibited signs of a market rendered topheacy by the activities of shoals of speculators, acting unintelligently, who at last became frightened and dumped millions of shares in a way temporarily to swamp the Exchanges.. . . The only event which can bring about a serious decline in stock value is a severe business slump, whch does not seem likely from present indications. [Fisher, 10/28/1929] Immediately after the Crash, the outlook remained optimistic:
The price of industrial stocks at less than 11 times their earnings seems too low a ratio, in view of the expectation of a faster rate of earnings in future and of the diminished risks of modem investment methods.. . . The 16 Fisher's optimism, however, is consistent with his data. In contrast to the Harvard speculation index ( A ) , which shows a 10 percent decline from March to June 1929, the Fisher stock price index shows no decline. Similarly, the Cowles (1939) stock price index, whch has been widely used in recent studies, has some RucSuations but is essentially flat over the interval. market has, therefore. good reason for recovering on a new plateau. [Fisher. 11/4/1929] As the recession deepened, Fisher's optimism bordered on advocacy, inveighng aganst dire interpretations of the direction of current indicators:
It should be noted that while the stock exchange endured the severest panic in hstory, t h s did not suffice to shake the price level of stocks off a warrantable h g h new plateau, which had been built up since 1922.. . . The function of the stock market is to reflect the discounted value of future increased business, as clearly foreshadowed in the increasing rate at which earnings are plowed-back into industry. [Fisher, 12/30/1929] W h l e prediction is always hazardous in economic statistics. and I wish to avoid malung any definite prediction. it would not be surprising ~f by next month the worst of the recession will have been felt and improvement looked for. [Fisher. 1/20/1930] In the early summer of 1930, Fisher remained unwilling to read calamity into the current economic situation.
Comparisons with the 1920-21 recession predominated in his analysis-as they did in Harvard's-but Fisher's brand of optimism remained both stronger and more colorful:
It seems manifest that thus far the difference between the present comparatively mild business recession and the severe depression of 1920-21 is like that between a thunder-shower and a tornado. [Fisher. 5/19/1930] By winter of that year. Fisher finally acknowledged the seriousness of the economic situation; yet like members of the Harvard group, he continued to see the potential for an imminent upturn and expressed h s hopes with mounting drama: Doubtless, to many, this will be the winter of our discontent. and to all of us it is as gloomy as the darkness that preceeds dawn.. . . One would expect the bottom to be reached in the stock market prior to the upturn in commodity prices. Since the middle of November this seems to have been the case. [Fisher, 12/1/1930] In attempting to review and estimate the business situation, it is sometimes necessary, during a business depression such as this, to find hopeful signs in negative figures. Such a potential state of affairs holds true just now. [Fisher, 2/2/1931] The industrial giant has become conscious again. He is beginning to move around slowly in an effort to regain his feet, as the cobwebs from a knockout blow gradually clear from h s brain. [Fisher. 2/23/1931] By the end of 1931, when the Harvard team had begun to admit to the reality contained in the steady flow of bleak economic data. Fisher maintained hls optimism.
Business showed further gain last week, and if improvement continues at the present rate, September should mark the low of the depression. Particular attention is called to the fact that commodity prices for both raw materials and agricultural products were strong. No single factor would be as helpful to business as a cessation in the commodity price decline that has been continued for the past two years. [Fisher, 10/17/1931] Dutu Sourc,e.~. This section gives the details of the beginning monthly on a seasonally adjusted basis begindata used in this paper. Table A1 gives the HES's A , B, ning in 1889 in Moore (1961, p. 130) . and C series and Fisher's stock and commodity prices.
The interest rate series is the three-month time loan The source for these series and the modern historical rate collected and analyzed by Mankiw, Miron, and data are as follows: Weil (1987, p. 372 Base, 1890-1927 (1928) . We have been unable to locate The Industrial Production Index is a revised seasonthis series in present-day BLS sources. ally adjusted series published by the Federul Reserve
The stock price is Cowles's (1939) all commodity Bourd in Statistical Release G12.3, July 18, 1985. stock price index (Series P-1).
Babson's index of industrial production closely tracks the FRB's during the period of overlap. It is published 
